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THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
AND THE POWER OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY TO IMPOSE A FINE
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet the rising concern for our environment, the Illinois General
Assembly recently passed the Environmental Protection Act.' Finding that
damage to the environment seriously endangered the public welfare, 2 two
agencies were established to administer a statewide program to make and
enforce rules designed to protect the environment. The Pollution Control
Board was established to adopt rules and regulations and also to conduct
hearings concerning violations of such.3 Upon finding a violation, the Board
is empowered to issue a cease and desist order, revoke the violator's emission
permit,4 or impose a penalty "not to exceed $10,000" for each violation and
in addition a penalty "not to exceed $1,000 for each day during which [such]
violation continues." 5  A second and separate agency, the Environmental
Protection Agency, was created to investigate violations of the Act and
prosecute them before the Pollution Control Board. 6 In short, the general
Assembly had set up an environmental police force and an administrative
court system capable of imposing fines upon violators.
This scheme presents two basic issues. First, whether the violators of
this act are denied due process of law by being fined without having been af-
forded a judicial trial. Second, whether the Board's power, both to determine
whether a violation has occurred for which a monetary penalty will result
and also to determine the amount of that penalty, is a grant of judicial power
to the executive branch of government. If it is such a grant of judicial powers,
it would be an invalid grant because it would violate the Illinois Constitutional
provision concerning the separation of powers between the executive, judicial
and legislative branches of government.7
1. ILL. RI V. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1001-1051 (1971).
2. Id. § 1002(a)(1).
3. Id. § 1005.
4. Id. § 1033.
5. Id. § 1042.
6. id. § 1004.
7. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 1 provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
The requirement of separation of powers is a requirement that is imposed upon the
states by their own constitution. The federal doctrine of separation of powers is not a
federal constitutional requirement that the states must follow. See International Broth-
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Before considering the case law concerning these two issues, the En-
vironmental Protection Act should be examined in more detail. When the
Act discusses the penalties that may be imposed by the Pollution Control
Board, it treats them as civil penalties rather than criminal penalties. It states
that anyone who violates the Act shall be liable for a penalty which "may be
recovered in a civil action."8  However, violations of the Act are also made
misdemeanors and the state and local law enforcement authorities are
authorized to prevent such violations.9 The purpose of these penalties is to
assure that "adverse effects upon the environment are . . . borne by those
who cause them." 10
The imposition of penalties by the Pollution Control Board is qualified
by elaborate procedural safeguards. First, the investigatory and prosecutorial
functions are carried out by one agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency," while the adjudicatory function is carried out by another agency,
the Pollution Control Board.' 2 The alleged violator is given written notice
of the specific charges against him and the right to file a written answer.' 3
Furthermore, the burden of proof is upon the Agency to prove the acts
complained of. 14 At a hearing, open to the public, the accused has the right
to be represented by counsel, offer oral testimony or written statements,
cross-examine witnesses, have all testimony recorded,' 5 and the power to
subpoena witnesses. 16 Standards are provided to guide the adjudicator in
making a decision as to whether there was a violation, 17 and the final order
is required to be in writing and state the facts and reasons upon which the
decision is based.' 8 Finally, judicial review is allowed under the Adminis-
trative Review Act.' 9
II. THE CONTROVERSY ARISES
The two issues raised by the Act, those of a possible denial of due
process and a possible illegal grant of judicial powers to an agency of the
executive branch of government, were first considered in Illinois by the
erhood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). The requirement of due process, however,
while being generally self-imposed upon the states through their own constitutions, see
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; is also imposed upon the states by the United States Con-
stitution through the Fourteenth Amendment and upon the federal government through
the Fifth Amendment.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1042 (1971).
9. id. § 1044.
10. Id. § 1002(b).
11. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 111 , §9 1004, 1034, 1031 (1971).
12. Id. § 1005, 1031-1033.
13. Id. § 1031(a).
14. Id. § 1031(c).
15. Id. § 1032.
16. Id. § 1005(e).
17. Id. § 1033(c).
18. ld. § 1033(a).
19. ld. § 1041.
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Third District of the Illinois Appellate Court in Ford v. E.P.A .20 The
petitioner contested the assessment of a $1,000 penalty imposed by the
Pollution Control Board on two main grounds: (1) that the Act had il-
legally conferred judicial powers upon the Board, and (2) that the Act had
denied his right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. While
noting that the legislature could not confer judicial powers upon an admin-
istrative agency, and that such an agency could not impose criminal penalties,
the court found that the penalty here was really a civil sanction and, therefore,
constitutional.21  The court found this power to be only a quasi-judicial
power which could be conferred upon an administrative agency when:
[D]irect immediate judicial action is inexpedient or impractical,
.. . laws conferring such powers are complete in their content, are
designed to serve a general public purpose, are such as to require a
consistent and immediate administration, and . . . all [such] ad-
ministrative actions are subject to judicial review. 22
The court felt that the distinction between the power to revoke a license,
which had long been recognized as a permissible sanction to be employed by
the executive branch, and the power to impose a monetary penalty, often held
to be an impermissible sanction, was not a meaningful distinction. A license
revocation, the court reasoned, could have a much more serious effect upon
a violator than a fine. Therefore, if an agency of the executive branch could
revoke a license, it should also be allowed to impose a monetary penalty. 23
However, when the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court con-
sidered these same questions in City of Waukegan v. E.P.A .,24 it found that
this fining power was not a sanction which could lawfully be imposed by an
administrative agency. The Second District emphasized that the Pollution
Control Board had not only the power to levy a fine, but also the discretion
to determine the amount of the fine. The power to impose a discretionary
fine was found to be a judicial power and not a quasi-judicial power. Hence,
the court held this power to be in, violation of the Illinois constitutional
provision concerning the separation of powers. 25 The court did not decide
whether an administrative agency could constitutionally impose a fine whose
amount had been fixed by the legislature. 26 In a vigorous dissent, 27 Justice
Seidenfeld agreed with the Ford decision and said. that the power to impose
a flexible monetary penalty should be upheld as a "necessary power to
achieve an urgent legislative purpose which is sufficiently circumscribed by
20. 9 Ill. App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
21. Id. at 715, 292 N.E.2d at 542.
22. Id. at 716, 717, 292 N.E.2d at 543, 544.
23. Id. at 718, 292 N.E.2d at 545.
24. 11 111. App. 3d 189, 296 N.E.2d 102 (1973).
25. Id. at 195, 296 N.E.2d at 107.
26. Id. at 194, 296 N.E.2d at 106.
27. Id. at 196, 296 N.E.2d at 108.
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standards, procedural safeguards, and meaningful judicial review," all of
which he found to be present in this Act. 28
III. THREE QUESTIONS
When case law applicable to the issue of whether an administrative
agency may impose a monetary penalty is examined, three questions are
presented. First, whether such agencies may impose a fixed monetary penalty.
Second, whether such agencies may impose a discretionary monetary penalty.
And third, the distinction between a civil penalty, which may be imposed by
an agency, and a criminal penalty, which may not be imposed by an agency.
As these questions are considered, it is important to note the additional
factors which have been relied upon by the courts in their determination of
the validity of the penalty power in question.
A. May an Administrative Agency Impose a Fixed Monetary Penalty?
In Illinois, the first cases which dealt with an agency's power to impose
a fixed monetary penalty all held that such a power was unconstitutional.
29
This apparent distaste for administratively imposed fines, however, did not
last. The tide turned with the case of Department of Finance v. Cohen.30
In that case, it was found that the determination of a tax deficiency by the
Department of Finance without the taxpayer being afforded a judicial trial
was proper, being within the agency's constitutional powers. The taxpayer
had been given notice, a hearing before the agency and had a right to judicial
review under the act. In finding it a valid administrative function, the court
reasoned that the legislature could not be expected to provide for every
detail and that it was necessary for them to delegate a reasonable amount of
discretion to the executive branch.31 Several years later the Illinois Supreme
Court said in Department of Finance v. Gandolfi: 1 2
28. Id. at 202, 296 N.E.2d at 112.
29. The first case was Beesman v. City of Peoria, 16 Ill. 484 (1855), in which
it was held that the mayor of Peoria, who had levied a $25 fine for the violation of the
town's Sunday blue laws, had improperly exercised judicial powers. In Cleveland,
Cinn., Chic., and St.L. Ry. v. People, 212 Ill. 638, 72 N.E. 725 (1904), a fixed penalty
of $10 was provided by statute for a person failing to annually clean the bed of any
drainage stream of impediments. This was assessed without a hearing by a tax
assessor. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court said at 640, 72 N.E. at 726
that an agency had no power to judge persons guilty of violation a statute and there-
upon inflict a penalty. Yet another monetary penalty was found invalid in Reid v.
Smith, 375 Ill. 147, 30 N.E.2d 908 (1940), this time one of $10 per day upon state
contractors paying their laborers less than the prevailing wage which had been levied
by the administrative branch. This power to levy a penalty was found to be judicial in
nature and therefore was not to be granted to an administrative agency. Again this
penalty was imposed without a hearing.
30. 369 Ill. 510, 17 N.E.2d 327 (1938).
31. Id. at 515, 17 N.E.2d at 328.
32. 375 Ill. 237, 30 N.E.2d 737 (1940).
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Our decision in Department of Finance v. Cohen, supra, that the
power to review and revise tax returns under the Retailer's Occupa-
tion Tax is ministerial, and not judicial, as requiring merely a calcu-
lation or computation from data upon which all minds must
ordinarily reach the same result, applies with equal force to the
assessment of penalties [levied by the executive branch for violation
of this tax act]. (Emphasis added.) 33
Illinois had therefore recognized the power of an administrative agency
to impose a monetary penalty, at least one which was a fixed sum or a sum
that could be uniformly calculated from a defined formula. While the change
in the court's attitude toward administratively imposed fines might be ex-
plained as merely reflecting a trend toward granting the executive branch
additional power, another factor should be considered. The earlier cases all
involved fines which were imposed without a hearing. 4 However, in both
the Gandolfi and Cohen cases the agency carried out its assessments only
after a full administrative hearing. Therefore, whether an administrative
hearing was afforded to the violator is a determinative factor of the validity
of an agency's fining power.
The Gandolfi court treated fines whose amounts may be calculated
uniformly by a formula in the same manner as fines that are fixed in amount.
When the United States Supreme Court has considered the power of an
agency to impose fines, it has found no more objection to penalties having
formula calculated amounts than it has to penalties having fixed amounts.
In Bartlett v. Kane,35 a penalty imposed by a customs official upon an
importer for undervaluing his goods by more than ten percent was found to
be within the executive branch's constitutional powers. The penalty, provided
by statute, was an additional duty of twenty percent of the assessed value
over and above the normal duty. This same penalty has been upheld in
several subsequent cases as incidental to the official's duty of collecting
tariffs upon the goods. 36 Here, as in Illinois cases upholding penalty powers,
the violators had all been afforded an administrative hearing before the
penalty was imposed.
In adjudicating fines of fixed amounts imposed by the executive branch
for violations of the immigration laws, the United States Supreme Court up-
held that fining power reasoning that:
[T]he statute imposing fines must be regarded as an incident to the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to control the admission
of aliens, and due process of law does not require that the courts,
rather than administrative officers, be charged . . . with determin-
33. Id. at 240, 30 N.E.2d at 739.
34. Supra n. 29.
35. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853).
36. Origit v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 288 (1894); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S.
214 (1893).
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ing the facts upon which the imposition of such a fine depends.
(Emphasis added.) 3 7
It was further noted in this case that if the Congress had the power to grant
such a penal power, the severity or amount of the fine that could be granted
was irrelevant and in no way determined the validity of the power. 38 The
Court stipulated, however, that the violators must be afforded a full admin-
istrative hearing before such penalties may be imposed.39
In all the cases in which the United States Supreme Court has upheld
an agency's power to fine, either the violators had been afforded an admin-
istrative hearing, or the violators did not raise any objection as to the lack
of such a hearing. As was the case with the Illinois Supreme Court, the
provision for an administrative hearing certainly would undercut the sugges-
tion that due process was lacking.
A case illustrating the importance of an administrative hearing is Lipke
v. Lederer.40  The National Prohibition Act provided that a double tax rate
would be imposed on those engaged in the illegal business of selling or
producing liquor, and additional fixed penalties could be imposed. Although
part of this Supreme Court decision was based on the determination that the
penalty was criminal in nature, the Court stated: "We cannot conclude...
that Congress intended that penalties for crime should be enforced through
the secret findings and summary action of executive officers."'41 However,
the statute was later amended to provide a hearing for those assessed such
taxes and penalties. When three United States district courts were faced with
this change, two of them invalidated the assessments in accordance with Lipke,
and did not decide whether a hearing remedied the problem. 42 However, the
third court felt that there was no longer any objection to this penalty power
now that a fair hearing was afforded, and the court upheld the assessments. 43
The importance of procedural due process was further pointed out in a later
decision of the Supreme Court, Helvering v. Mitchell,44 which noted that many
37. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335 (1932). See also Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
38. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335 (1932). See also Helver-
ing v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938), in which an administratively imposed tax
penalty of $364,354.92 was upheld, the Court noting, "In spite of the comparative se-
verity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially
criminal ...... Accord, Wright v. S.E.C., 112 F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1940); West
Romaine Corp. v. Calif. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 266 C.A.2d 901, 905, 906, 72 Cal. Rptr.
569, 571 (1968).
39. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336, 337 (1932).
40. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
41. Id. at 562. Accord, Regal Drug Corp. v. Wandell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922).
42. Dukich v. Blair, 3 F.2d 302 (D. Wash 1925), appeal dismissed, 270 U.S.
670 (1926); Jasper v. Hellmich, 4 F.2d 852 (E.D. Mo. 1925).
43. Seligman v. Bowers, 4 F.2d 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S.
642 (1926).
44. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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cases placed greater emphasis upon the procedural due process aspects of the
proceeding in question than on other matters.45
The United States Supreme Court has also upheld fixed or formula
calculated penalties in a number of other administrative fields. 46 This pattern
of upholding fixed or formula calculated penalties has also been followed in
the state courts.47
In summary then, the question has not been so much whether fixed or
easily calculable fines may be imposed by an administrative agency, as the
imposition of many such fines have been upheld. Rather, the question has
often been whether the violator has been afforded due process, as by afford-
ing him an administrative hearing. As noted before,48 the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Act provides very extensive procedural safeguards sur-
rounding the imposition of any fines imposed under the act.
In addition, the Supreme Court has upheld an agency's fining power
where the agency was operating in a field over which the Congress had
plenary powers. The presence of such plenary power is another factor to be
considered and is very relevant when applied to the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act. The field of environmental regulation seems to be clearly
within the plenary powers of the General Assembly, for the duty to see that
the public's right to a healthful environment is protected is specifically given
to the General Assembly in the 1970 Illinois Constitution.49 The Illinois
Constitution further provides that persons may enforce their right "through
appropriate legal proceedings" 50 which are "meant to include. . . administra-
tive proceedings" in addition to other types of proceedings, such as judicial
proceedings.6 1
45. Id. at 400 n.3.
46. Agency imposed penalties ,have been upheld when imposed for: tax fraud,
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); presentment of fraudulent claims upon the
United States, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); fraudulent
purchases of government surplus goods reserved for veterans, Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); and transactions in bituminous coal which resulted in
unfair trade practices, Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
47. In Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909), the court
upheld a penalty of one dollar per day to be paid a shipper by a railroad which was
guilty of an unreasonable delay in providing a railroad car for the shipper's use. An
identical statute was upheld in Keystone Lumber Yard v. Yazoo and M.V.R.R., 97
Miss. 433, 53 So. 8 (1910). In Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 173, 180 A. 272 (1935), a
statute providing that the comptroller could exact a penalty for tax deficiencies which
were the result of negligence or fraud was upheld.
48. See text accompanying nn. 11-19 supra.
49. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 provides, "The public policy of the State and the
duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment . . . . The
General Assembly shall provide by law for implementation and enforcement of this
public policy."
50. Id. § 2.
51. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REcoRD OF PROCEEDINGS, CoM-
MrrrEE PROPOSALS, Vol. VI, 705.
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The administrative fining power granted by this Act then has two counts
in its favor: (1) the power is only exercised within a framework which pro-
vides for extensive procedural safeguards, and (2) the Act itself is designed to
carry out a function clearly within the legislature's plenary powers.
B. May an Administrative Agency Impose a
Discretionary Monetary Penalty?
Whereas monetary penalties which were fixed in amount have encoun-
tered little trouble in the courts, statutes which have allowed an agency the
discretion to decide the amount of the penalty have been the subject of
closer scrutiny. 5 2 As noted before, the Environmental Protection Act em-
powers the Pollution Control Board to impose an initial penalty of up to
$10,000 and subsequent penalties of up to $1,000 per day while the violation
continues.5 3 The question then is not merely whether the Board may impose
a fine, but whether it should have the power to fix the amount of that fine.
The issue has not yet been directly faced by the Illinois Supreme Court.
However, there are two cases which have indirectly touched on the issue.
The only case in Illinois prior to the Ford54 case which involved the im-
posing of a discretionary monetary penalty is People v. Sholem.55 In that
case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a statute giving the
State Fire Marshall the power to levy a fine from $10 to $50 upon anyone
who failed to comply with his order to correct fire hazards in the building.
However, the primary reason the statute was held invalid was because the
statute lacked sufficient standards upon which the Fire Marshall could de-
termine what constituted a fire hazard. The power to impose a discretionary
fine was not in itself decided.
The case which comes closest in Illinois to answering the question of
whether an administrative agency may impose a discretionary fine is People
v. Wilson Oil Co.,5 6 which involved a tax on motor fuels. The statute pro-
vided that before an application for a retail gasoline dealer's license could be
approved by the Illinois Department of Finance, a bond was to be posted.
The amount of this bond was to be determined by the Department of Finance
by calculating the amount of revenue expected from that individual dealer,
and the bond would be forfeited if the dealer failed to pay the coming year's
motor fuel tax. The discretionary power to determine the amount of the
bond was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court as incidental to the Depart-
ment's administrative purpose of protecting the state against the possible loss
of revenue.
52. For a comparison of fixed and flexible penalties see Schwenk, The Adminis-
trative Crime, its Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 51, 79-85 (1943).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11Y, § 1042 (1971).
54. Ford v. E.P.A., 9 Ill. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
55. 294 Ill. 204, 128 N.E. 377 (1920).
56. 364 Ill. 406, 4 N.E.2d 847 (1936).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
There are no federal cases dealing with the power of an administrative
agency to determine the amount of a fine.57 However, this question has been
directly faced in a number of states. Those jurisdictions are split on the
issue of whether administrative agencies should have such a discretionary
fining power. Illustrative of the position of those opposed to such power is
the case of Tite v. State Tax Commission.58  In Tite, the Utah Supreme
Court found unconstitutional a statute which provided that the State Tax
Commissioner could levy a penalty of $10 to $299 upon any person who
failed to affix tax stamps to certain enumerated products, such as cigarettes
and margarine. The court's reasoning was that:
Giving to the tax commission the power to determine in its own
judgment the amount of the penalty was a legislative function which
could not be delegated. It is not the power to enforce or apply a
law, but the power to make a law for each particular case, to deter-
mine in its judgment the amount of a penalty . . . . The infirmity
[of this law] lies in the fact that the tax commission can in each case
name a different sum. It has not set a standard for all cases which
fit the rule, but in each case within its mind at its discretion fixes
the amount. Only the courts in imposing a fine as a punishment for
a crime have this discretion. 59
This case, however, has been severely undermined by a more recent decision
of the Utah Supreme Court in Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Commission.60
In Wycoff, the statute provided that a regulatory commission could subject
public utilities which violated any order of the Commission to a penalty of
$500 to $2,000. This power to levy a discretionary penalty was found to
be within the commission's constitutional powers.
Despite the Wycoff Co. case, however, there are other states which agree
with Tite's reasoning. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Broadhead v.
Monaghan6 found unconstitutional, for reasons similar to those in Tile, a
statute which allowed the Revenue Department to impose a penalty for tax
delinquencies ranging in amount from ten percent to twenty-five percent of
the deficiency. In that case, no hearing regarding the assessment was afforded
the violator. In State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines,6 2 a North Carolina case, the
executive branch had been given the power to fine an insurance agent for
57. However, there have been several cases which dealt with administrative discre-
tion in determining the severity of penalties that were not of a monetary nature. In
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), a statute was found unconstitutional
which allowed immigration officials to imprison any alien at hard labor for up to a year.
In Nadiak v. C.A.B., 305 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1962), the Civil Aeronautics Board utilized
its wide discretionary powers to discipline pilots by temporarily suspending a pilot's
license for flying too close to another plane. The court said at 593 that where the de-
cision making is highly technical, the agency must give wide discretion in imposing
penalties.
58. 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936).
59. ld. at 416-18, 57 P.2d at 740-741.
60. 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819 (1962).
61. 238 Miss. 239, 117 So. 2d 881 (1960).
62. 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968).
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certain violations of state law in amounts varying from nominal sums to
$25,000. The right to an administrative hearing was allowed here. However,
while the statute was found unconstitutional, this court did not rule out the
possibility that some discretionary monetary penalty might be upheld. The
court said the test was whether the power was "reasonably necessary as an
incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which . . . [the] agency
was created .... ,,6 The Lanier court's decision turned on the considera-
tion of two factors: (1) the purpose of the agency, and (2) the nature and
extent of the penalty power. 6
4
A special administrative court, the Marine Navigation Court, was con-
sidered in State v. Osborn,6 5 a New Jersey case. Upon convicting a person
for a violation of the navigation rules provided in the statute, the court had
the power not only to impose a fine up to $100, but also the power to jail
the violator if he did not pay the fine. Both the statute and a $100 fine
which was imposed under it were set aside as an illegal exercise of judicial
powers. Finally, in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 66 a Florida statute
allowing a state commission to fix a penalty upon a railroad of up to $500
for violations of its rate and schedule regulations was found invalid, again
being deemed an unconstitutional grant of judicial powers.
Although all the above state cases overturned statutes providing dis-
cretionary monetary penalties, all the cases except for Atlantic Coast Line
have certain factors which either distinguish them from the statutory scheme
in Illinois or which lessen their precedential value. Tite was probably over-
ruled sub silentio by the Wycoff case, in that Wycoff's holding was directly
opposite to Tite and lacked any distinguishing factors. In Broadhead, the
penalty was levied without even affording an administrative hearing. As
noted before, the Illinois Environmental Protection Act provides for a hearing
prior to the imposition of any penalty. The court in Vines did not hold that
discretionary penalties were invalid in all cases, but only held them invalid in
certain cases. Lastly, in Osborn, the agency had not only the power to fine,
but also the power to imprison upon a default in the payment of the fine. No
such power to imprison is given the Pollution Control Board in the Illinois
Act.
In addition to Wycoff, there have been several other cases which have
upheld agency's power to impose a discretionary monetary penalty. In State
Tax Commission v. Stanley,67 an Alabama statute was upheld which allowed
the State Tax Commission to levy a penalty of $25 to $500 upon anyone
failing to affix required tax stamps upon cigarettes and certain other goods.
However, the power was limited by the fact that the accused could demand a
63. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 168.
64. Id.
65. 32 N.J. 117, 160 A.2d 42 (1960).
66. 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
67. 234 Ala. 66, 173 So. 609 (1937).
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trial by jury in a civil proceeding rather than submit to the commission's
adjudication. In State v. Public Service Commission,"s a Washington agency's
power to impose "reasonable" penalties upon railroads to expedite the move-
ment of freight was considered. The court in that case saw the sanction not
as a penalty, but as compensation, similar to liquidated damages, in that they
were paid to the injured party, the shipper in that case. 69 Finally, while not
addressing the penalty power issue directly, a fine imposed by an agency
under a New York statute allowing a penalty of up to $1,000 for violations
of the state insurance law was upheld in Old Republic Life Insurance Co. v.
Thacker.70
In summary, although the courts are more likely to invalidate a
discretionary penalty power than a fixed penalty power, there is no general
rule that the courts will always invalidate such discretionary power. In order
to determine whether or not a discretionary monetary penalty should be up-
held, one must look beyond its discretionary nature to other relevant factors.
Whether procedural due process was afforded the violator or whether the
activity regulated was within the legislative body's plenary powers, which have
already been mentioned as considerations in the section on fixed fines, are
relevant when examining discretionary penalties. A number of other factors
which have also been utilized to determine whether an agency may impose a
fine, either fixed or discretionary in amount, are set forth in the following
section.
C. Civil Penalties and Criminal Penalties
As the distinction between fixed monetary penalties and discretionary
monetary penalties has failed to clarify whether an agency's fining power
should be upheld, many courts and scholars have employed a different test:
the distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty. Professor
Davis, in his treatise on administrative law,71 first notes that adminstrative
agencies may not impose criminal penalties and then states: "The problem
is therefore to distinguish between criminal penalties and civil or remedial
penalties .... ,,72
There are four major factors which have been utilized in drawing the
line between criminal and civil penalties. The first is the wording in the
statute which gave the power to impose a fine to the administrative agency.
An Illinois case, Cleveland, Cinn., Chic., and St.L.Ry. v. People,73 relied upon
68. 94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917).
69. Id. at 281, 162 P. at 528.
70. 12 N.Y.2d 481, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962).
71. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE.(1958).
72. Id. § 2.13 at 134.
73. 212 Ill. 638, 72 N.E.2d 725 (1904). The statutes provided such a fine for
anyone who failed to annually clean the bed of any drainage stream they owned of
impediments.
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this factor when it invalidated a $10 fine imposed under a statute by an
agency of the executive branch. The court said that agencies should have:
[N]o power to inflict penalties for violation of laws, or to determine
when a law has been violated and adjudge persons guilty. This...
is a penalty for the violation of law. This is apparent from the
wording of the statute, which expressly stated that a penalty shall
be inflicted. 74
This factor has also been found determinative by the United States
Supreme Court. In Wong Wing v. United States, 75 the Court considered a
statute which stated "[t]hat any such Chinese person . . . convicted and
adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be . . . in the United States, shall
be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year ....
(Emphasis added.) 76 The Court found this language to be, in effect, a
declaration that the prohibited activity is an infamous crime and, therefore, a
penalty for such activity may not be imposed by an administrative agency.77
While the harsh nature of the punishment was a factor in the Court's
decision, it is clear that whatever the penalty is, a legislative body cannot
both declare the act to be a crime and then leave to the executive branch
the power to determine guilt and thereupon mete out the punishment.
It seems clear that the Illinois General Assembly, when enacting the
Environmental Protection Act, intended by its wording that the violations
adjudicated and the penalties imposed by the Pollution Control Board under
the Act were to be considered civil in nature. The Act states that anyone who
violates the Act will be "liable" for a penalty which "may be recovered in a
civil action."178
The above rule, developed in Cleveland and Wong Wing, however, must
be distinguished from the situation where a statute provides for both civil and
criminal penalties for violations of an act. This is the case with the Environ-
mental Protection Act. The Act not only provides for the civil penalty
mentioned above, but also states in a separate section that violations of the
Act are misdemeanors and state law enforcement officers are empowered to
enforce it.7 9 The Act, therefore, provides the state with a choice of enforce-
ment by either criminal or civil means. This scheme of civil and criminal
penalties has been faced before. In considering a penalty of $1,000 recovered
by the government in court in a civil action, the Supreme Court in Hepner v.
United States"° found no objection to the recovery of such a fixed penalty
in a civil proceeding, even though the penalty was also recoverable in a
74. Id. at 640, 72 N.E. at 726.
75. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
76. Id. at 235.
77. Id. at 237.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1042 (1971).
79. Id. § 1044.
80. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
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criminal proceeding. 8 ' That the conduct penalized also happens to constitute
a crime does not seem to negate the penalty's civil nature, and a number of
cases have upheld such administrative penalties.8 2
A second factor used to separate civil and criminal penalties is the
nature of the penalty itself. As noted before,83 the severity of a penalty will
not determine whether an administrative agency may impose it. However, the
type of penalty itself, whether it involves a fine or imprisonment, is relevant
to the determination of whether an administrative agency may impose it.
It is clear that neither the power to imprison an individual 4 nor the
power to change an imprisoned person's sentence85 may lie with an admin-
istrative agency. Imprisonment has been traditionally used as a punishment
for criminal activity and has, therefore, become criminal in nature. Although
fines have also been utilized as criminal penalties they have not been so
intertwined with criminality in general as to be automatically characterized as
a criminal penalty. This seems apparent from a number of cases already
cited which have upheld administratively imposed fines.
A third determining factor is the purpose the penalty is to serve. The
issue is whether the penalty's purpose is penal in nature (i.e., intended to
punish the violator) or remedial in nature (i.e., intended to reimburse the
injured party). The intent of the legislature and the manner in which the
penalty operates will determine which of these purposes the statute serves.
In defining a penal sanction, the Illinois Supreme Court in Cleveland, Cinn.,
Chic., and St.L.Ry. v. People,8 6 said that imposing a penalty upon the mere
finding of a violation of the law is penal in nature.87 The United States
Supreme Court, in Lipke v. Lederer,s8 found that imposition of penalties for
the failure to pay federal income tax on income gained from illegal activities
had a penal purpose. The Court reasoned that the penalties were imposed
only after finding that a crime had been committed, that of producing or
selling liquor outlawed by the prohibition laws then in effect. Therefore, the
penalties were really intended to punish those carrying on such illegal activi-
ties and were not merely incidental to the Internal Revenue Service's purpose
of collecting taxes.8 9 However, as emphasized before, the majority of courts
81. Id. at 108.
82. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Cermak Club, Inc. v. Illinois Comm'n, 30 Ill. 2d 90, 195
N.E.2d 178 (1963); Appeal of Lewis, 208 Okla. Crim. 610, 258 P.2d 173 (1953);
State v. Moyers, 86 Okla. Crim. 101, 189 P.2d 952 (1948).
83. See text at n.38 supra.
84. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); People v. Mallory, 195
Ill. 582, 63 N.E. 508 (1902); State v. Osborn, 32 N.J. 117, 160 A.2d 42 (1960).
85. People v. Montana, 380 111. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569 (1942).
86. 212 Ill. 638, 72 N.E. 725 (1904).
87. Id. at 640, 72 N.E. at 726.
88. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
89. Id. at 562.
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have not found a penalty to be criminal in nature merely because the activity
may also be prosecuted as a criminal activity.
Turning to remedial penalties, it seems clear that if the penalty assessed
is paid directly to the injured party, then it has a remedial effect. Three state
cases 90 considered administratively imposed penalties which were paid over to
the private parties who had been injured. All of the penalties were upheld
as being civil in nature. The courts likened these penalties to liquidated
damages.
When the monetary penalty is retained by the government, who purports
to be the injured party, this does not necessarily negate its remedial nature.
Although the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 9 1
found a monetary penalty to be criminal and not remedial because it was
designed primarily to redress a public wrong and not a private wrong,9 2 the
United States Supreme Court has found otherwise. The Court in Helvering
v. Alitchell 93 found that a penalty for a tax deficiency caused by fraud in the
amount of fifty percent of the deficiency was civil and not a criminal penalty.
It found that this penalty was remedial in nature in that it was intended not
only as a safeguard to the government from such fraud, but also as compen-
sation for the heavy expense resulting from losses due to taxpayers' fraud and
the expense of investigating such fraud.9 4 The Supreme Court has also found
other monetary penalties to be remedial. This included a statute which al-
lowed the government to recover a flat sum of $2,000 plus double the amount
of damages caused by the fraudulent purchase of government surplus goods
reserved for veterans, 95 and another which provided a $2,000 penalty upon
any person who presented a fraudulent claim against the United States.96
The fixed recoveries were again compared to liquidated damages.
Although the fines imposed under the Environmental Protection Act are
retained by the state rather than payed over to private individuals who may
have been injured, there is a remedial intent expressed in the Act. In setting
out the purposes for which the Act was designed, the Statute states that the
"adverse effects upon the environment are . . . [to be] borne by those who
cause them. ' '97  The remedial intent is, therefore, clearly expressed. The
90. In Southern Ry. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277, 65 S.E. 665 (1909) and in Keystone
Lumber Yard v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 97 Miss. 433, 53 So. 8 (1910), a penalty of a dollar
per day for railroad cars unreasonably detained by a railroad was upheld. In State v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917), a penalty which was imposed
upon carriers for violation of rules designed to expedite the movement of freight was
upheld. In all these cases the penalties were paid over to the injured parties, the
shippers in these cases.
91. 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
92. Id. at 650, 47 So. at 980.
93. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
94. Id. at 401.
95. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
96. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
97. ILL. REV. STAt. ch. 111 , § 1002(b) (1971).
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statute also operates to produce a remedial effect in that it compensates the
public for both the damage done to the environment as well as for the
expenses incurred in protecting the environment against such harmful activi-
ties.
The final factor to be considered in delineating between criminal and
civil sanctions is whether the fining power granted to an administrative agency
is necessary and incidental to that agency's lawful purposes. Here, a relevant
consideration is whether the degree of efficiency, speed, and technical exper-
tise gained by granting such a fining power to the administrative agency is
necessary for the enforcement of the Act. This factor has been emphasized
in a number of cases. 98
The question of whether this factor is present in the Act (i.e., whether the
fining power granted by the Environment Protection Act is necessary and
incidental to the Pollution Control Board's purposes) must be answered in the
affirmative. Pollution control is undoubtedly a technical field requiring ex-
pertise to determine the existence, source and amounts of harmful pollution.
These questions are not the proper subject of inquiry for a jury of layman in
a criminal or a civil trial. Although expert witnesses may be employed, this
method has often failed in other technical areas and is likely to be inadequate
here. In considering the relative speed of the administrative and judicial
processes, the administrative process is, of course, a faster method of enforcing
the Act. It is also a more efficient method, as it places the body which is
vested with the policy making powers in a position to tailor the enforcement
practices to best meet its policy goals. Furthermore, a statewide agency such
as this is more likely to enforce the law uniformly.
In summary, an administrative agency may impose a civil penalty and
whether the penalty is characteristized as civil, rather than criminal, depends
on several factors. Those factors are: (1) how the legislature characterized
the penalty, as determined by the statute's wording; (2) the exact type of
penalty imposed; (3) whether the penalty serves a remedial or a penal pur-
pose; and (4) whether the penalty is necessary and incidental to the agency's
lawful powers.
IV. SUMMARY
There is no general rule that an administrative agency may or may not
impose a monetary penalty. There is also no general rule that an administra-
tive agency may impose a fixed monetary penalty, but may not impose a
discretionary monetary penalty. Each individual fining power must be ex-
amined by the courts.
98. People v. Wilson Oil Co., 364 Ill. 406, 4 N.E.2d 847 (1936); Dep't of Finance
v. Cohen, 369 Ill. 510, 17 N.E.2d 327 (1938); Dep't of Finance v. Gandolfi, 375 Ill.
237, 30 N.E.2d 737 (1940); State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161
(1968); and State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917).
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When the Environmental Protection Act is examined in light of these
factors, it appears that it has been well tailored to meet these various tests.
The Act has provided the violators with elaborate procedural safeguards
before any fine may be imposed, the wording of the Act reveals the legislative
intent that the penalties are to be civil in nature, the penalties are intended
to be remedial in that violators are to bear the cost of the harm they have
caused, the fining power is necessary and incidental to the Agency's duty of
protecting the environment and the field of activity in which these fines are
to be imposed is clearly within the plenary power of the Illinois General
Assembly.
The urgency of the problem of environmental protection is a determina-
tive factor in the finding of whether the legislature has plenary powers in
this field and whether the granting of of such a fining power to an administra-
tive agency is really necessary. The urgency of the problem is well docu-
mented in both the Act and the Illinois Constitution. The general Assembly
has found that "environmental damage seriously endangers the public health
and welfare . . ."99 Every day that there is a delay in enforcing the Act,
the damage to the environment continues.1 00 The seriousness and urgency
with which the General Assembly viewed the environmental crisis was con-
curred in very strongly by the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.10 '
In the report submitted by the committee responsible for framing the constitu-
tional provision dealing with the environment it was said: "Without exception,
there was agreement that pollution of the environment is occurring and that
the problem has reached crisis proportions."'01 2 The new Illinois Constitution
has declared that the right to a healthful environment is a fundamental
right.'0 3
The question of whether the Pollution Control Board's power to impose
a discretionary fine is constitutional will undoubtedly be resolved soon, as an
important provision of a major act can not be left in doubt long. However,
when one considers both the urgency of the problem of environmental pro-
tection and the careful tailoring of this Act to the tests used by other courts,
one must conclude that the Board's fining power should be upheld.
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99. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111 , § 1002(a)(1) (1971).
100. This is probably the reason an additional penalty of up to $1,000 per day for
continuing violations is provided for in the statute. See ILL. REV. STAT. oh. 11 ,
§ 1042 (1971).
101. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, VER-
TiATIM TRANSCRIPTS, Vol. IV, 2991, 2993, 3012.
102. SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, COM-
MITTEE PROPOSALS, Vol. VI, 696.
103. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. See also SIXTI ILLINOIS CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, Vol. IV, 2991, where one of
the framers stated "Section 3 (now section 2, art. XI) grants each person the right to
a healthful environment. We believe that this is a fundamental right."
